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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN STANDARDS:
DOES ANTITRUST LAW IMPOSE A DUTY TO
DISCLOSE (EVEN IF THE STANDARDS-SETTING
ORGANIZATION DOES NOT)?
Krista S. Jacobsent
Abstract
An engineer sits quietly in a standards-setting organization
(SSO) meeting at which technical proposals for a new high-speed
digital subscriber line (DSL) modem are presented and discussed as
part of the process of generatinga new standard.He watches as one
of his company'sfiercest rivals makes a proposalfor how the modem
at the customer's premises will send diagnostic information to the
modem at the telephone company's central office. To his surprise,the
proposal incorporates the very data protocol for which he and a
colleague filed a patent application three months earlier. The
proposal is well received by the other attendees, and after a short
discussion, the group agrees to include in the standard the proposal
that uses the method disclosed in the engineer's patent application.
As the editor of the standardrecords the agreement on the issues list,
the engineer smiles, knowing that implementation of his soon-to-bepatented invention will be essentialfor anyone who wishes to build
modems compliant with the standard.
Does he have to say anything to the other SSO participants?
Courts have found that if an SSO has a policy requiring its
members to disclose information about their existing patents and
pending patent applications,thus creating an obligation to speak,* a

Associate, Covington & Burling LLP, 333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 700, Redwood
t
Shores, CA 94065. This paper was the culmination of an independent study of the intersection
of antitrust law and intellectual property law overseen by Professor Catherine Sandoval while
the author was a student at the Santa Clara University School of Law. The author is grateful to
Professor Sandoval for undertaking the independent study and for her invaluable guidance in the
preparation and refinement of this paper.
*
Most SSOs impose intellectual property (IP) disclosure requirements on their
participants, but sometimes the policies are not entirely clear. See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon
Tech., AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1097-98 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding a patent policy that said,
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patent holder who remains silent can be estoppedfrom enforcing its
patents against those who wish to implement the standard.** But
what if the SSO has no policy requiring its members to disclose
information about their intellectual property (IP) rights? Does the
engineer who attends the SSO meeting and knows that the SSO is
incorporatinghis invention in the standardstill have an obligation to
tell the other SSO participantsabout the pending patent? If he says
nothing, and the standardthat eventually issues does indeed contain
his innovation, can he refuse to license the patent to those who wish
to build standard-compliantequipment? If he agrees to license the
patent, can he demand higher royalties than he would be able to
collect for that patent absent the standard? This paper considers
these questions.
INTRODUCTION

Antitrust law "protects competition and the competitive process
by preventing certain types of conduct that threaten a free market."'
The primary objective is "to maximize consumer welfare by
promoting competition among firms."2 Antitrust law protects
competition by prohibiting competitors from agreeing on the prices
they will charge consumers, prohibiting "predatory" practices that
exclude competitors from the market, and limiting the behavior of
companies with market power. 3
Most cases considering whether antitrust law imposes a duty to
disclose IP to SSOs concern instances of non-disclosure or misleading

"Standards that call for the use of a patented item or process may not be considered by a JEDEC
committee unless all of the relevant technical information covered by the patent or pending
patent is known to the committee, subcommittee, or working group" did "not impose any direct
duty on members"); Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 52 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006
WL 2330117, 25 (finding the "EIA/JEDEC policies [were] not a model of clarity" because they
specified only that members had a duty of good faith).
**
James C. De Vellis, Patenting Industry Standards: Balancing the Rights of Patent
Holders with the Need for Industry-Wide Standards, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 301, 332-33 (2003). See,
e.g., Stambler v. Diebold, II U.S.P.Q.2d, 1709, 1714-155 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying equitable
estoppel and explaining that a patent owner cannot "remain silent while an entire industry
implement[s] the proposed standard and then when the standards [are] adopted assert that his
patent cover[s] what manufacturers believed to be an open and available standard").
1. Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 237, 241 (2007).
2. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3rd Cir. 2007) (citing PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
I00a (Aspen Publishers 2006)).
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

3.

Lemley, supranote 1, at 241.
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disclosure to SSOs that have disclosure policies.4 Likewise, most
commentators considering the problem either presume the SSO
imposes a duty or they recommend that SSOs implement disclosure
policies.5 In contrast, this paper considers whether antitrust law itself
imposes a duty to disclose one's IP to a standards-setting
organization, even if the SSO does not have any policy requiring such
a disclosure. In particular, the paper examines whether a failure to
disclose IP to an SSO can ever constitute a Sherman Act violation.
The paper concludes that a patent holder's failure to disclose its
essential patents, followed by its refusal to license those essential
patents to other parties, can constitute a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act if the patent holder is the only holder of essential IP
who refuses to license. The paper then proposes the essential facilities
doctrine as a remedy for such a Section 2 violation.
STANDARDS-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS

A standard is a set of rules for implementing a technology.6 A
standards-setting organization is an official body, such as a
7
government agency, an industry
working group, 8 or an academic
consortium, 9 that promulgates standards. Participants in SSOs are
typically engineers and scientists working in government or private
industry.10 Companies who send representatives to SSO meetings

4. See, e.g., In re Dell Computer, Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (Fed. Trade Comm'n May 20,
1996); Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech., 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Qualcomm, Inc. v.
Broadcom Corp., 2007 WL 1031373 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007).
5. See, e.g., David M. Schneck, Setting the Standard: Problems Presented to Patent
Holders Participatingin the CreationofIndustry Uniformity Standards, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 641 (1998); James C. De Vellis, PatentingIndustry Standards: Balancing the Rights
ofPatentHolders with the Needfor Industry-Wide Standards, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 301, 301 (2003).
6. Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 634 (2002).
7. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which is under the auspices of
the United Nations, is an example of a governmental standards body. See International
Telecommunications Union, About, http://www.itu.int/net/about/index.aspx (last visited May
12, 2010).
8. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is an example of an
industry
standards
body.
See
IEEE,
IEEE
Standards,
http://standards.ieee.org/resources/development/index.html (last visited May 12, 2010).
9. Mueller, supra note 6, at 634 (citing Keith Lutsch et al., Compaq Computer Corp.,
Standards Activities in the Computer Industry, in 1998 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
INSTITUTE, SAN ANTONIO, TEX. (Mar. 20-21, 1998) at n.2).

10.

See IEEE, IEEE Standards, supra note 8.
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tend to be those whose business interests overlap with the focus of the
standardization effort. " Many of these companies are competitors. 12
To generate a standard, interested parties meet regularly, in
many cases four to six times a year for several years, to debate the
merits and disadvantages of various proposed technical solutions to a
particular problem.13 SSOs strive to create industry standards that will
be widely adopted.14 The standards promulgated by an SSO may
enhance public health and safety, or they may be so-called
interoperability standards, which ensure equipment manufactured by
different producers is compatible.'
THE EFFECT OF A STANDARD ON COMPETITION

In the absence of a standard, competing companies have the
freedom to produce exactly the products they believe consumers will
want. For example, in the field of digital televisions,16 one company
may choose to make televisions that use liquid crystal display (LCD)
technology, another may build televisions that use plasma displays,
and yet another may choose to build projection systems using digital
light processor (DLP@) technology. A company's eventual success
with its digital television in the consumer market will depend on a
number of variables, including price, picture quality, size, technology,
features, and design. Thus, companies making products that do not
incorporate standards compete entirely in the consumer market. Their
success or failure results directly from the choices they make in their
product offerings.

11.
See, e.g., Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, ATIS Members,
http://www.atis.org/atismembers.shtmI (last visited May 12, 2010).
12.
See id., e.g., the list of members of the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry
Solutions, http://www.atis.org/atismembers.shtml.
13. See, e.g., Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1085 (describing Rambus' participation in the
generation of the SDRAM standard).
14. De Vellis, supra note 5, at 336.
15.
Mueller, supra note 6, at 632-33. The standard at issue in Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495 (1988) was a type of safety standard because it
"established product and performance requirements for the design and installation of electrical
wiring systems." On the other hand, the standard for a mechanism to transfer instructions from a
computer's central processing unit to peripherals at issue in Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C.
616, 621 (Fed. Trade Comm'n May 20, 1996), was an interoperability standard, as was the
standard for computer memory at issue in Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 8 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL 2330117, 6.
16. Certain aspects of digital televisions are, of course, standardized. For example, the
video and audio signals are standardized. See Advanced Television Systems Committee, About
Us, http://www.atsc.org/cms/index.php/component/content/article/195 (last visited May 12,
2010). Display technology, however, is not standardized.
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When a product incorporates a standardized technology, the
competition model differs somewhat. Instead of having only one
phase of competition that takes place entirely in the consumer market
and requires companies to compete simultaneously on all the merits
of their products, a standard adds an earlier phase of competition that
concerns only a subset of the merits of competing solutions. During
this phase of competition, which takes place away from consumers
and generally occurs without their knowledge, candidate solutions
compete on the basis of technical merit and cost, and a group of
technical experts chooses a standard. In the subsequent consumermarket phase of competition, competing companies' standardcompliant products compete on the remaining merits, such as price,
quality, design, and the like.
Figure 1 illustrates the two phases of competition that result
when a product incorporates a standard.

Phase HI

Phase I
Solution X

Solution Z

Standard W

Product "W-A"
By Company A

Product "W-B'
By Company E

Product "W-C"

Product "W-D )

By Company C

By Company I

"

B

Figure 1: Two phases of competition resulting from standardization

In the first phase, denoted as Phase I, participants in an SSO submit
Solutions X, Y, and Z to the SSO. These solutions could be complete
in that any one solution by itself could constitute the standard, or,
more commonly, they could be solutions to specific problems within
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the scope of standardization.' 7 The SSO considers each of these
solutions in its process of writing the standard and eventually issues
Standard W, which is generally an amalgam of elements of Solutions
X, Y, and Z. After Standard W is complete, Companies A, B, C, and
D build standard-compliant equipment, which they then put into the
consumer market in the second phase of competition, denoted as
Phase II.
Thus, during the SSO process in Phase I, the competition is
between various technical alternatives as the SSO members decide
what to standardize. Ideally, in making this determination, the SSO
carries out its work in an environment "free of distortion, bias, or
manipulation by private interests," which results in "the choice of a
standard rest[ing] solely on a neutral evaluation of the costs and
benefits of a proposed technical solution."" Therefore, under ideal
circumstances, an SSO chooses the solution with the best
performance-cost trade-off because that solution most benefits
consumers. 19
Normally, when competitors take collective action, as they do
when they participate in efforts to standardize a technical solution,
antitrust concerns arise. 20 For example, Section 1 of the Sherman Act
forbids collective action among competitors by declaring unlawful
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several

17. As an example, a DSL standard specifies exactly what the transmitter must do.
Although conceivably a single proposal could specify all the requisite information, for various
reasons the SSO would be unlikely to adopt it in its entirety. It is more common for proposals to
suggest "smaller steps" toward standardization, such as a way to map data to signals, a
procedure to initialize modems, or the ordering of data that will be sent by the receiver for error
monitoring.
18.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amici Curiae in Support
of Neither Party at 4, In re Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. 2006) (No. 9302), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/040512rambusbrief.pdf [hereinafter AAI Amicus Brief].
See also Schneck, supra note 5, at 648 (noting that courts require standards to serve a legitimate
purpose).
19. It should be noted, however, that SSO leaders often strongly discourage SSO
participants, who are technical experts and not lawyers, from discussing the cost of a proposed
solution out of concern that such discussions could lead to antitrust violations. In the author's
experience, neither the cost nor price, in dollars, of a solution was ever discussed at SSO
meetings. Instead, meeting participants openly discussed only proxies for cost and price, such as
the number of semiconductor gates required to implement a solution, because the other SSO
participants understood that the number of gates in a chip is proportional to the cost of the chip,
other variables being equal.
20. Schneck, supra note 5, at 655 (observing that "[a]ntitrust liability presents a major
concern for participants in standard-setting organizations").
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states, or with foreign nations."2 1 SSO activities could conceivably fit
into this category, but in reality "SSOs do not resemble a collection of
horizontal competitors that conspires to raise price or to reduce
22
output," which is the behavior Section 1 aims to prevent. Instead,
companies participating in consensus standardization activities share
technical information to produce a standard; they do not share
sensitive business information in order to form a cartel.
Furthermore, when a standard is complete, it is available to parties
who did not participate in the SSO. 2 4 Because any party can practice
the resulting standard,25 the situation "differs from the typical case of
collusion among competitors, where the excluded party receives no
benefit from the arrangement." 2 6 Finally, as Figure 1 illustrates,
companies participating in SSOs do not avoid market competition;
rather, they shift the focus of market competition from the size and
nature of the market to the advantages and prices of individual
companies' standard-compliant products.27 In other words,
competitors who worked together to set a standard in Phase I compete
in Phase II in the consumer market primarily on the price and quality,
rather than on the technical features, of the standard-compliant
products they produce. Thus, by participating in SSO activities,
competitors delay, but do not avoid, competition amongst themselves.
The courts, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) have recognized that standards can
provide significant benefits for consumers, including interoperability
of equipment; product uniformity; allegedly higher-quality products
for consumers as a result of "expert" SSO comparisons of competing
solutions; incentives for innovation; increased competition because of

21.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2009).

22. Michael A. Carrier, Why Antitrust Should Defer to the Intellectual Property Rules of
Standard-SettingOrganizations:A Commentary on Teece and Sherry, 87 MINN. L. REV. 2019,
2032 (2003) (noting that "[tihe primary concern of section I is to prevent competitors from
entering into agreements that unreasonably reduce competition").
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2032-33.
25. The ITU, ISO, and IEC specifically incorporate this concept into the groups' common
Patent Policy. See ITU, Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC,
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/dbase/patent/patent-policy.html (last visited May 12, 2010) (indicating
that standards produced by the ITU, ISO, or the IEC "are non-binding; their objective is to
ensure compatibility of technologies and systems on a worldwide basis. To meet this objective,
which is in the common interests of all those participating, it must be ensured that [standards],
their applications, use, etc. are accessible to everybody") [hereinafter Common Patent Policy].
26. Carrier, supra note 22, at 2033.
27. AAI Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 3.
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lower barriers to enter a market with a standardized product; a longer
product life; lower development costs for standards-based products;
and lower marketing costs to bring products to a predefined,
standardized market.28 Furthermore, "industry standards are widely
acknowledged to be one of the engines of the modem economy"
because they "can make products less costly for firms to produce and
more valuable to consumers," and they "can increase innovation,
efficiency, and consumer choice; foster public health and safety; and
serve as a 'fundamental building block for international trade."' 2 9
Standards are exclusionary by nature, however, because
alternatives not chosen by an SSO in the Phase I competition are
likely to be at a competitive disadvantage in the Phase II consumer
market.30 By preventing worthy products or technologies from
competing meaningfully in the consumer market, standards can thus
impede or even prevent competition.31 Depending on the SSO's
selection, a standard may also slow innovation by "locking-in" an
inferior technology, and it may reduce consumer choice by reducing
the number of differentiated but incompatible products.32
Furthermore, SSO activities "inherently are 'rife with opportunities
for anticompetitive activity."'33 As the FTC has noted, "[e]ven under
the best of circumstances, . . . the standard-setting process has a

unique potential to skew the competitive process by aligning supply
and demand in a prescribed direction."3 4 Therefore, SSO activities are
not immune from antitrust scrutiny.s The courts, the FTC, and the
DOJ evaluate SSO activities under the "rule of reason." 3 6

28. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech., AG, 330 F. Supp. 2d 679, 696 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(citing De Vellis, supra note 5, at 316; Schneck, supra note 5, at 642).
29.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, 6-7 (2007),

available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/22265.pdf [hereinafter DOJIFTC Report].
30. AAI Amicus Brief, supranote 18, at 6.
Id. at 1-2.
31.
32. Id. at 20-21.
33. Rambus, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (quoting Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, 456 U.S. 556,
571 (1982)).
34.
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 33 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL
2330117, 17.
Schneck, supra note 5, at 655 (noting that because "[s]tandardization involves
35.
agreements among horizontal competitors," antitrust law can reach SSO activities).
36. Carrier, supra note 22, at 2032.
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STANDARDS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Because an industry standard will often "be built upon useful,
novel, and nonobvious technological advances as opposed to
whatever already exists in the public domain," sometimes the solution
chosen by an SSO incorporates a patented item or process. 37 Often an
interoperability standard in fields such as semiconductors,
telecommunications, and computer software will incorporate
hundreds or even thousands of patented inventions.
An SSO may deliberately choose to incorporate patented
technology in a standard,39 or it may do so inadvertently. 40 An SSO
could inadvertently include patented technology in a standard in
several ways. For example, the SSO could be unaware of a patent that
claims a technology already being standardized. 4 1 In addition, because
patent applications in the United States generally remain confidential
for a period of at least eighteen months after filing, 42 an SSO, having
no means to discover the content or existence of newer applications,
could inadvertently incorporate a technical advance that is in fact
disclosed in a filed but unpublished patent application.43
When a standard incorporates one or more patented inventions,
the owner of each patented technology can collect royalties for
licensing his or her patent rights to those who wish to practice the
standard. Many SSOs encourage or require their members to agree
37.
38.

Mueller, supra note 6, at 649.
Carrier, supra note 22, at 2033.

39.

See, e.g., Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2000)

(finding that because Townshend lobbied the SSO to adopt its technology and made the SSO
aware of its pending patents, the SSO had knowingly incorporated Townshend's technology in a
voice band modem standard).
40. See, e.g., In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 617 (FedTrade Comm'n May
20, 1996) (finding that the SSO had unwittingly adopted Dell's patented technology because it
relied on Dell's representative's certification in writing that to the best of his knowledge the
pending standard did not infringe any of Dell's patents).
41.
Given the vast number of both United States and international patents and pending
patents, it is unlikely that an SSO would ever have perfect knowledge of the universe of
patented inventions and inventions disclosed in pending applications.
42. A United States resident-inventor who does not plan to file for patent protection in a
foreign country can elect, at the time of filing a patent application in the United States, to
prevent publication of that application. When the inventor makes this election, the fact that a
patent is pending remains confidential, unless disclosed by the inventor. Furthermore, the
invention itself remains secret until the patent issues. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213 (West 2009)
(providing that "[i]f the invention disclosed in an application has not been and will not be the
subject of an application filed in another country, or under a multilateral international
agreement, that requires publication of applications eighteen months after filing, the application
will not be published" after the expiration of eighteen months).
43. Schneck, supranote 5, at 663.
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that if a standard incorporates a patented invention, the SSO member
who owns the essential IP will license its patent rights under fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms." Although an
SSO may wish to avoid standardizing a solution that requires those
implementing it to pay royalties to a patent holder, the FTC has
explicitly said that an SSO "must not refuse requests for inclusion of a
specific technology into an industry standard solely because that
technology is patented." 45 Such per se exclusion of a solution simply
because it is patented would violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act because it "would result in the exclusion of
innovative products from market entry and mislead purchasers about
the nature of the product that was not included in the standard." 46
ANTITRUST AND STANDARDS

Courts and the FTC have recognized that a party's conduct at an
SSO meeting can violate the antitrust laws even if that conduct does
not violate the SSO's own rules. 47 For example, courts have imposed
antitrust liability on SSO participants who have manipulated the
standards process 48 and on participants who have improperly used the
resulting standard to gain a competitive advantage over a rival.49 In
44. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 304 (3rd Cir. 2007)
(noting that the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) "requires a
commitment from vendors whose technologies are included in standards to license their
technologies on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" terms); DOJ/FTC Report, supra note
29, at 36 (noting that some SSOs require members to commit to license on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms any of their IP that is essential to practice a standard); Common Patent
Policy, supra note 25 (patent disclosure policy requiring those who know of patents or pending
patent applications that read on the standard to elect to (1) "negotiate licences [sic] free of
charge with other parties on a non-discriminatory basis on reasonable terms and conditions"; (2)
"negotiate licences [sic] with other parties on a non-discriminatory basis on reasonable terms
and conditions"; or (3) state that the patent holder is not willing to license its patents either free
of charge or on reasonable terms and conditions, in which case the patented technology will be
stripped from the standard).
45. Schneck, supranote 5, at 647-48.
46. Id.
47. Rambus, 330 F. Supp. 2d 679, 698 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing Allied Tube & Conduit
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 (1988). See also Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 35
(Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL 2330117, 18 (observing that even if an SSO does
not require disclosure of IP rights, "SSO members still are not free to lie or to make
affirmatively misleading representations").
48. See, e.g., Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509-11 (finding a Sherman Act violation because a
manufacturer of steel conduit packed a standards meeting with new members whose only
function was to vote against the inclusion of poly-vinyl chloride (PVC) conduit in the standard).
49. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 65960 (1961) (finding a Section 1 Sherman Act violation following a refusal to provide gas for use
in gas burners because those burners were not included in a standard).
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addition, when an SSO participant "commandeers" a standard through
its conduct, that party's actions may be reached by the antitrust
laws.50 The risk of harm to competition from SSO activities "is
heightened in the face of exclusionary conduct that does not constitute
competition on the basis of efficiency and that interferes with the
cooperative nature of the standard-setting process.',s The concern is
greatest when an SSO carries out its work by consensus, ostensibly
because "participants in the standard-setting process are likely to be
less wary of deception; they are less likely to detect and take
countermeasures to counteract it, and anticompetitive effects therefore
are more likely to result."5 2
CAN A FAILURE TO DISCLOSE IP TO AN SSO CONSTITUTE A
SHERMAN ACT VIOLATION?

Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations . ...
The Supreme Court has stated that a Section 2 violation has two
elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in a relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition, maintenance, or use of that power by
anticompetitive or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or
exclusionary purposes."54 This section examines whether the conduct

50. Rambus, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (quoting Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 511).
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 33 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL
51.
2330117, 17.
52. Id. In the author's experience, this characterization of SSO participants is inaccurate.
At least in the SSO meetings the author attended over a span of approximately twelve years,
participants were not naive technical experts with no consciousness of the possibility of
deception or, in particular, the likelihood that IP was embedded in other participants' proposals.
On the contrary, most SSO participants assumed that if another company submitted a proposal
that appeared to be new, in that they had not seen it in another field or application, it likely was
new, and therefore its proponent had almost certainly filed a patent application covering that
proposal. Thus, the objective of most SSO participants was not so much to resist adopting
another company's IP, but instead to ensure the standard would require a license to at least one
of their own company's patents to preserve the possibility of a cross-license agreement, which
would cost little or nothing, rather than a one-way licensing agreement, which could cost a lot.
15 U.S.C. §2 (2009).
53.
54. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 (1985)
(citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). At note 19, the Court
quoted the test from Grinnell, the second element of which differs slightly from the Court's test
in Aspen Skiing Company. The second element of the Grinnell test is "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."
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of a patent holder who fails to disclose IP to an SSO can constitute a
Section 2 Sherman Act violation.
WHAT IS THE RELEVANT MARKET?

The first step in considering a possible Sherman Act violation is
to define the relevant market. 5 The Supreme Court has said that the
"outer boundaries of a relevant market are determined by reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between
the product itself and substitutes for it." 56 Products are
interchangeable if "one product is roughly equivalent to another for
the use to which it is put; while there may be some degree of
preference for the one over the other, either would work
effectively." 57 An assessment of reasonable interchangeability should
take into account factors such as price, use, and quality.58
At the outset, it is important to recognize that during Phase I,
there is no relevant market because the competition is between
candidate solutions. This competition takes place away from the
public, and the issuance of the standard then creates a consumer
market in Phase II. Thus, the task here is to define the relevant market
in Phase II, after the standard has issued.
Two cases illustrate how courts determine whether products are
reasonably interchangeable and thus what the relevant market is. In
Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc., a tying
case, the Supreme Court considered whether a party's lack of market
power in a tying market precludes the possibility of market power in
derivative aftermarkets. 9 Kodak sold photocopiers and micrographic
equipment, and it sold service and replacement parts for its
equipment. 60 The replacement parts were not compatible with other
61
manufacturers'
equipment.
Several
independent
service
organizations (ISOs) began servicing Kodak's equipment in the early
1980s; as compared to Kodak's service, the ISOs' service was
significantly less expensive and, in some customers' opinions, of
55. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3rd Cir.
1997).
56. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
57. Queen City Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d at 437 (quoting Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Bus.
Mach. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 206 (3rd Cir. 1994)).
58. Id. (citing Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3rd Cir.
1991)).
59. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 455 (1992).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 457.
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higher quality. 62 In the mid-1980s, Kodak began selling replacement
parts for its equipment only to buyers who used Kodak service or who
repaired their own equipment.6 3 Kodak also limited ISOs' access to
other sources of Kodak parts.M The ISOs subsequently had difficulty
selling their services, and customers were forced to use Kodak
service, even though some of them preferred ISO service.65 The ISOs
sued, alleging Kodak had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
unlawfully monopolizing and attempting to monopolize the sale of
service for Kodak equipment. 6
The Court first observed that, for antitrust purposes, the relevant
market for service of Kodak equipment was determined by the
choices available to Kodak equipment owners. Because the parts
and service for Kodak equipment were not interchangeable with parts
and service for other manufacturers' photocopier equipment, the
Court found the relevant market comprised only those companies that
provided service for Kodak machines. The Court found that in some
circumstances, a single brand of product can constitute a separate
market.

The case of Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.
concerned a franchise agreement between Domino's Pizza and its
independent franchisees.70 Because "[t]he essence of a successful
nationwide fast-food chain is product uniformity," Domino's required
its franchisees to enter into a franchise agreement that obligated the
franchisees to purchase only pizza ingredients, beverages, and
packaging materials that conformed to standards set by Domino' S.71
The contract provided that Domino's could, in its sole discretion,

62. Id.
63. Id. at 458.
64. Id. In particular, Kodak (1) convinced the original equipment manufacturers who
made its parts not to sell the parts to anyone other than Kodak; (2) pressured Kodak equipment
owners and distributors not to sell Kodak parts to the ISOs; and (3) restricted the availability of
used Kodak equipment.
65. Id. at 458.
66. Id. at 459. The ISOs also alleged that Kodak had violated Section I of the Sherman
Act by unlawfully tying the sale of service of Kodak equipment to the sale of parts for Kodak
equipment.
67. Id. at 481-82.
68. Id. at 482.
69. Id. (citing Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 101-02, 111-12 (1984); Int'l Boxing Club ofN.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242,
249-52 (1959); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936)).
70. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 433 (3rd Cir. 1997).
71.
Id.
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require franchisees to purchase ingredients, supplies, and materials
exclusively from Domino' S.72 Under the franchise agreement,
Domino's proceeded to sell approximately ninety percent of the
ingredients and supplies used by its franchisees. The franchisees
sued, alleging Domino's had a monopoly in the market for sales of
supplies to Domino's franchisees, and that Domino's "used its
monopoly power to unreasonably restrain trade, limit competition,
and extract supra-competitive profits."7 4 Domino's moved to dismiss
the claim, arguing the franchisees had failed to allege a valid market,
as required for Sherman Act claims. The district court granted the
motion, finding that the franchisees were required to purchase
supplies from Domino's not because Domino's dominated the market
for supplies, but rather because the franchisees had entered a contract
that allowed Domino's to require the franchisees to purchase
ingredients exclusively from Domino's. 76 The franchisees appealed.77
The Third Circuit first examined whether the franchisees had
defined a valid relevant market for their antitrust claims.78 Relying on
Kodak, the franchisees had argued that the relevant market was the
"ingredients, supplies, materials, and distribution services used by and
in the operation of Domino's pizza stores."79 The court disagreed with
the franchisees, observing that the relevant inquiry was "not whether
a Domino's franchisee may reasonably use both approved or nonapproved products interchangeably. . . , but whether pizza makers in
general might use such products interchangeably." 80 Because the
ingredients and supplies used by Domino's franchisees were
interchangeable with the ingredients and supplies used by other pizza
companies, the relevant market was comprised of both approved and
non-approved ingredients and supplies.8 1 The court found the relevant
market was all pizza makers, not just Domino's pizza stores, because
unlike the machines at issue in Kodak, which required unique parts,

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 434.
75. Id. at 435.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 436.
78. Id. at 436-41.
79. Id. at 437.
80. Id. at 438.
81. Id. Indeed, the court observed that "the availability of interchangeable ingredients of
comparable quality from other suppliers, at lower cost," had motivated the lawsuit.
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pizza sold by Domino's pizza stores is not a unique product requiring
ingredients that cannot be used by other pizza makers. 82
These cases provide a basis to determine the relevant market for
a product that is standardized. Although compliance with many
standards is optional in the sense that a company may offer or sell a
non-standard product,83 interoperability is critical in areas such as
84
computers, telecommunications, and the Internet. For example, a
computer with non-standard networking hardware, rather than
standard-compliant Ethernet or IEEE 802.11 functionality, has limited
networking utility.85 Thus, when a consumer wishes to use such a
computer in an established network or with equipment that conforms
to standards, the computer would have limited networking utility
because it is not "roughly equivalent" to a computer with Ethernet or
802.11 capabilities. Consequently, standards in many industries are
"effectively mandatory and must be used in order to participate in the
market." 8 6 A non-standard product in a standards-based industry
might not work for its intended purpose and thus cannot be
considered "reasonably interchangeable" with a standard-compliant
product.
What about when two standards provide similar, but not
identical, functionality? As an example, consider broadband. Both
cable modem technology and DSL are standardized." Are DSL
modems and cable modems "reasonably interchangeable" for antitrust
purposes? Although a consumer might be fortunate enough to have a
choice between cable modem service and DSL service, many
consumers have only one broadband alternative.88 A consumer cannot
82. Id. at 440.
83. The ITU's web site states that the standards it produces "are non-binding; their
objective is to ensure compatibility of technologies and systems on a worldwide basis."
Common Patent Policy, supra note 25.
84. AAI Amicus Brief, supranote 18, at 1. See also Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n.,
522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that ninety percent of computer memory produced is
compliant with the standards at issue in the case, "and therefore the technologies adopted in
those standards . .. enjoy a similar level of dominance over their alternatives").
85. Jim Geier, Overview of the IEEE 802.11 Standard, INFORMIT, Dec. 6, 2001,
http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2441 1.
86. AAI Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 1.
87. Cable modem technology is standardized by a consortium of companies in the DataOver-Cable Service Interface Specifications (DOCSIS@). See DOCSIS@ - FAQs,
http://www.cablelabs.com/cablemodem/faqs (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). DSL is standardized
by the ITU. See ITU and its Activities Related to Internet Protocol (IP) Networks, Chapter
Seven: Case Study-How ITU's Broadband Standards Improve Access to the Internet,
http://www.itu.int/osg/spulip/chapter-seven.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
88. Brief Amicus Curiae of Professors Jack M. Balkin et al. Urging That The FCC's
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connect a cable modem to a phone line to receive DSL service, and
she cannot connect a DSL modem to a cable outlet to receive cable
modem service.8 9 Thus, for consumers who have access to only one
type of broadband, DSL modems and cable modems are not
"reasonably interchangeable"; they are completely different products,
each useless for the other's purpose. Furthermore, the price, speed,
and nature of DSL and cable services differ, and it is not clear that
even those consumers with a choice between the two services would
consider them to be interchangeable. 90 Even if consumers with a
choice considered DSL service and cable modem service to be
interchangeable, the modems required for each would remain
incompatible.
Further, standards are typically unique because SSOs try to avoid
promulgating multiple standards that solve the same problem. For
example, the IEEE is the SSO that promulgates wireless local area
networking (WLAN) standards. 91 Likewise, the ITU-T is responsible
for international standardization of DSL. 92 Thus, when a standard
exists to provide a specific capability, it is likely to be the only such
standard providing that capability.
Kodak supports the notion that when a commodity is unique and
not interchangeable with other products, a single brand of product can
constitute a separate market. 93 Unlike the pizza supplies at issue in
Queen City Pizza, a non-standard product is not reasonably

Order Be Affirmed at 27-28, Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc'n. Comm'n, No. 08-1291 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 5, 2009).
89. A DSL modem connects via an RJ-l I jack to a telephone line and transmits and
receives baseband signals, whereas a cable modem connects via a coaxial connector to the cable
network and transmits and receives passband signals. NIKIL A. JAYANT, BROADBAND LAST
MILE ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES FOR MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS 222, 256 (CRC Press

2005).
90. For example, Comcast advertises "Comcast High-Speed Internet with PowerBoost,"
which supports speeds up to 16 Mbit/s; Comcast claims its service is "way faster than DSL."
Comcast High-Speed Internet, http://www.comcast.com/HighSpeedlntemet/ (last visited Apr. 3,
2010).
IEEE Wireless Local Area Networks, http://www.ieee802.org/ll/ (last visited May
91.
12, 2010).
92. ITU-T Study Group 15, Optical transport networks and access network
infrastructures,
http://www.itu.int/net/ITU(Study
Period
2009-2012),
List
of
Questions
T/lists/questions.aspx?Group=15&Period=14 (last visited May 12, 2010) (indicating the area of
responsibility for Q4/15 is "[t]ransceivers for customer access and in-premises networking
systems on metallic conductors").
93. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992).
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interchangeable with a standard-compliant product. 94 Furthermore, a
product that is compliant with one standard, such as the cable modem
standard, is not compliant with another standard, such as a DSL
standard. Therefore, because standards are unique, products that
comply with a particular standard can be considered to be a single
"brand," and the associated relevant market comprises only products
that are compliant with that standard.
DOES THE HOLDER OF ESSENTIAL IP FOR A STANDARD HAVE
MONOPOLY POWER INTHE RELEVANT MARKET?
Having determined that for antitrust purposes the relevant market
is the standardized product, the next step in a Section 2 inquiry is to
determine whether a party who holds a patent that is essential to
practice the standard has monopoly power in that market. The
Supreme Court has said that monopoly power under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act requires "something greater than market power under
section 1."95 Thus, it is necessary to decide first whether a patent
holder whose patented technology has been standardized by an SSO,
either intentionally or unwittingly, even has market power in the
relevant market. If so, then it is necessary to decide whether the patent
holder's market power rises to the level of monopoly power.
A party has market power if it has "the 'power to control prices
or exclude competition"' in the relevant market.96 The Supreme Court
has said that a patent does not necessarily confer market power on its
owner.9 7 When implementation of a standard requires the use of a
patented invention, however, the standard can confer additional
economic value on a patent holder beyond the value of the patented
invention itself.9 8 As the FTC has said, "[a] patent holder's market
power may be materially enhanced once the patented technology is
incorporated into a standard, as alternatives become less attractive
relative to the chosen technology and less able to constrain its
price." 99 As a result, "the ex post value of a patent (after adoption of

94. Contra Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438 (3rd Cir. 1997)
("[T]he dough, tomato sauce, and paper cups that meet Domino's Pizza, Inc. standards and are
used by Domino's stores are interchangeable with dough, sauce and cups available from other
suppliers and used by other pizza companies.").
95. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956)).
97. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006).
98. AAI Amicus Brief, supranote 18, at 7.
99.
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 35 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL
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an effectively mandatory standard requiring its use) will exceed its
value ex ante (before adoption of the effectively mandatory
standard)."' 0 0 Consequently, even if the patent itself did not give the
patent owner market power, the inclusion of that patented invention in
a standard at least increases the value of the patent to the patent owner
and may give the patent owner market power in the consumer
market.10
Standardization of a patented technology can also increase the
likelihood of market power in another way. As time passes after an
SSO issues a standard, "the industry commits greater levels of
resources to developing products that comply with the standard, [and]
the costs of switching to alternative technologies begin to rise."' 02 As
a result, members of the industry may become "locked in" to the
standardized technology, which means the costs to switch to another
technology are significant enough that switching is onerous.io3
The Supreme Court considered the problem of "lock in" in
Kodak when it considered whether Kodak had market power in the
service and parts market for its machines.10 4 Kodak argued that it
could not have market power in the service and parts market, which
was the aftermarket, because it did not have market power in the
equipment market. 05 In response to the observation that Kodak's
service was more expensive than ISO service, Kodak asserted that
although the pricing of its service exceeded ISO pricing, Kodak's
marketing strategy was to offer a "package deal" that would spread
over time the total cost of Kodak equipment, including the parts and
service. o0 Therefore, Kodak argued, its customers were purchasing
equipment at sub-competitive prices, and it was making up the
difference by charging supra-competitive prices for service; thus, the
overall pricing was competitive.' 0 7
The Court first noted that Kodak's pricing theory was
inconsistent with its policy of providing parts to customers who
serviced their own machines: if Kodak priced its machines sub2330117,
100.
101.
102.
4.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

18.
AAI Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 7.
Id.
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 4 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL 2330117,
Id.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476 (1992).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 472.
Id.
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competitively, it would lose money on its self-service customers.los
After finding Kodak's customers were unable to assess accurately at
the time of purchase how much it would later cost to have their
machines serviced, the Court observed that once customers had
purchased a Kodak machine, which required a "heavy initial outlay,"
the costs to switch to a different brand were high.1 09 As a result,
customers who had already purchased Kodak equipment were "locked
in" to Kodak's service and would tolerate at least some level of price
increase before switching to a different brand of equipment." 0 The
fact that Kodak's equipment customers were "locked in" to Kodak's
service supported the Court's conclusion that there was a question of
fact whether Kodak had market power in the service and parts
market. "'
Like the equipment customers in Kodak, those who have
invested time and resources in preparing to produce a standardcompliant product may find it more economical to pay supracompetitive licensing fees to the patent holder rather than re-tool to
produce a non-standard product that does not infringe the patent. 112
Thus, lock-in also has the potential to increase the patent holder's
market power.
Although it is clear that the holder of a patent that is essential to
a standard has some market power, in order to constitute a Section 2
Sherman Act violation, that market power must rise to the level of
monopoly power. In determining whether a patent holder whose
technology has been standardized has monopoly power in the relevant
market, it is useful to consider two possible scenarios. In the first
scenario, a single patent holder owns all patents incorporated into the
standard, and in the second scenario, several patent holders own
different patents that collectively are essential to practice the standard.
Although the first scenario is probably unusual, it could arise if a
technology is truly revolutionary, only one party has engaged in the
research and development of that revolutionary technology, and that
one party owns all existing patents on that technology." 3 It could also
108. Id. at 472-73.
109. Id. at 477.
110. Id. at 476.
111. Id. at 477.
112.
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 4 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL
2330117,4.
113. An example of such a revolutionary technology is Texas Instruments' (TI's) digital
light processing (DLP@) technology, which is used in televisions and projectors. Although TI
chose to maintain DLP@ as a proprietary technology, had it instead chosen the standardization
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arise if a party were to purchase all patents in a particular field. When
a single patent holder owns all patents required to practice a standard,
if the patent holder is so inclined and is not otherwise obligated to
license its patents,' 14 the patent holder may choose not to license its
patents to any other party." 5 In this case, the patent holder would be
the only party who could practice the standard. Under these
circumstances, the patent holder would have complete "power to
control prices or exclude competition" in products compliant with the
standard and would thus have monopoly power in the relevant
market.
What if, instead of refusing to license its patents, the patent
holder agrees to license but demands high royalties? If the royalties
are so high that none of the patent holder's competitors can afford to
pay the royalties and still sell a price-competitive standard-compliant
product, and they thus refrain from participating in the relevant
market, the patent holder is in the same position as when it refuses to
license at all. In this case, the patent holder has monopoly power
because it has complete control of prices and has excluded
competition by demanding too-high royalties.
If, on the other hand, the patent holder charges royalties that are
higher than its competitors would like, but competitors are still
willing to pay, it is a closer question as to whether the patent holder
has monopoly power. Because lock-in is likely in play, the patent
holder's competitors might have to raise the prices of their standardcompliant products in order to make a profit. The Supreme Court has
said, however, that higher consumer prices do not necessarily indicate
Moreover, if competitors are
harm to the competitive process.
willing to pay the patent holder's demanded royalties in order to build
standard-compliant products, the cost of royalties is likely a small
component of the overall product cost. Thus, the patent holder's
competitors may be able to find a way to save costs in other areas to

route, it almost certainly would have owned all the patents on the technology. See How DLP@
Technology Works, http://www.dlp.com/tech/what.aspx (last visited May 12, 2010).
114. For example, the patent owner has not committed to license its IP on FRAND terms.
115. The patent laws of the United States specifically provide that "[n]o patent owner
otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of ... illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his ... having refused to license or
use any rights to the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). Thus, Congress has expressly provided
that a patent owner who refuses to license her patent to others does not illegally extend her
patent right.
116. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing NYNEX Corp. v.
Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136 (1998)).
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offset the increased cost due to royalties.117 Therefore, even if they
have to pay exorbitant royalties to the patent holder, the competitors
still may be able to meet or beat the patent holder's price.
Furthermore, even if the patent holder's competitors' products
are priced higher than the patent holder's products, the patent holder
can only raise the price of its own product to approximately the same
price as its competitors; otherwise, absent some advantage other than
standard compliance, consumers will likely buy its competitors'
lower-priced products. Thus, when the patent holder charges high
royalties, but its competitors are willing to pay, it is unlikely that the
patent holder has monopoly power because it does not have
significant power to control prices, and it has not excluded
competition.
In the second scenario, several parties hold patents, and each
company's patents are essential to practice the standard. In this case,
the patent holders collectively have market power because use of the
collection of patents they own is essential to practice the standard.
Acting together, the patent holders could control prices or exclude
competition, but such action would clearly violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.118 Does any single patent holder have market power?
Assume only three patent holders-A, B, and C-own patents that are
essential to practice the standard. If all three have agreed to license
their essential patents, for example, on FRAND terms, then all three
can practice the standard, as can any other party willing to pay for
patent licenses. In this case, none of the holders of essential IP has the
power to control prices or exclude competition, and none has
monopoly power in the relevant market. Conversely, if each of A, B,
and C decides independently not to license its patents to others, no
one can practice the standard. Although in this scenario each patent
holder has the power to exclude competition, each is also excluded
from competing as a result of the actions of the other two patent
holders. A party who cannot participate in the market cannot have
monopoly power in that market.

117. For example, competitors could choose a different semiconductor process, integrate
more or less of the solution in application-specific integrated circuits, or fabricate the product in
less expensive off-shore facilities.
118. DOJ/FTC Report, supra note 29, at 37. The DOJ and FTC "condemn as per se illegal
activities designed to reduce or eliminate competition among members of an SSO-such as bid
rigging by members who otherwise would compete in licensing technologies for adoption by the
SSO or naked price fixing on downstream products by members who otherwise would compete
in selling downstream products compliant with the standard."
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What if, however, B and C agree to license their patents on
FRAND terms, and A does not? Now A has the power to practice the
standard itself and deny that ability to every other party. In this case,
A has the power to be the only participant in the market. A party who
is the only possible participant in a market can control prices and, by
definition, excludes competition. Thus, such a party has monopoly
power in that market."1 9
Therefore, whether a party who owns IP essential to practice a
standard has monopoly power turns not only on whether that party
refuses to license its IP but also on whether it is the only party
refusing to license its IP to those who wish to practice the standard.
When a single party refuses to license patents essential to the practice
of a standard, that party has monopoly power in the relevant market.
This analysis suggests that a failure to disclose relevant IP to an
SSO, standing alone, is not enough to constitute Section 2 Sherman
Act violation because a patent holder who fails to disclose in Phase I
that it has essential IP might still agree in Phase II to license that IP
under terms that are not so onerous as to confer monopoly power on
the patent holder. In order to violate Section 2, the patent holder who
fails to disclose the existence of patents and patent applications in
Phase I must then actually or effectively refuse to license its patents in
Phase II. Additionally, the patent holder must be the only party to
refuse to license patents that are essential to the standard because if
others also refuse to license essential patents, the patent holder cannot
practice the standard and thus cannot have monopoly power in the
relevant market.
DID THE PATENT HOLDER ACQUIRE ITS MONOPOLY POWER BY
ANTICOMPETITIVE OR EXCLUSIONARY MEANS?

The final inquiry in a Section 2 violation is whether the patent
holder acquired its monopoly power by anticompetitive or
exclusionary means.120 Here, the concern is with a patent holder who
failed to disclose material information about its patents in Phase I and
who, in Phase II, is the only holder of essential IP who actually or

119. Note that whether A has monopoly power in the relevant market depends in part on
what B and C do. If B and C behave pro-competitively but A does not, A can have monopoly
power in the relevant market. In contrast, if two of the three parties behave anti-competitively,
neither of those parties has monopoly power because each blocks the other from the market.
120. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
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effectively refuses to license that IP to competitors. Thus, the inquiry
is a narrow one.
The cases of Kodak and Queen City Pizza support the idea that
antitrust law reaches market power obtained as a result of a lack of
disclosure of relevant information to a decision-maker. In Kodak, the
Supreme Court found unpersuasive Kodak's argument that it sold its
equipment at sub-competitive prices and made up the difference by
charging supra-competitive prices for service. 12 1 The Court observed
that "[flor the service-market price to affect equipment demand,
consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of the 'package'equipment, service, and parts-at the time of purchase; that is,
consumers must engage in accurate lifecycle pricing." 2 2 To perform
such an analysis, customers would need "data on price, quality, and
availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance the
initial equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including
estimates of breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service
and parts, length of 'downtime,' and losses incurred from
downtime." 2 3 Because it was expensive and difficult, if not
impossible, for most of Kodak's customers to engage in accurate
lifecycle pricing, the Court found it was unreasonable "to assume, in
the absence of any evidentiary support, that equipment-purchasing
decisions [were] based on an accurate assessment of the total cost of
24
equipment, service, and parts over the lifetime of the machine."
Thus, because Kodak disclosed no contract terms related to service at
the time of the equipment sale, it was inappropriate for Kodak to
leverage its market power in the service market later to force its
equipment customers to purchase Kodak service.125
In Queen City Pizza, in contrast, the Third Circuit found no
failure to disclose with the Domino's franchise agreement because,
unlike the customers forced to buy Kodak's service in Kodak, "the
Domino's franchisees could assess the potential costs and economic
risks at the time they signed the franchise agreement." 2 6
Consequently, the "franchise transaction between Domino's Pizza,
Inc. and [the franchisees] was subjected to competition at the pre-

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 472 (1992).
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 473-76.
Id. at 477.
Queen City Pizza v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440 (3rd Cir. 1997).
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contract stage."1 27 The court thus found compelling that Domino's
had adequately informed the franchisees of future costs, noting that
the franchisees "need not have become Domino's franchisees. If the
contractual restrictions . . . were viewed as overly burdensome or
risky at the time they were proposed, plaintiffs could have purchased
a different form of restaurant, or made some alternative

investment."l 2 8
How do these cases apply in the context of SSOs? Both Kodak
and Queen City Pizza stand for the proposition that a decision-maker
cannot make an informed decision about a "package"-be it copiers
and service, or a pizza franchise and supplies-if he or she does not
know the total cost of that package. 129 Likewise, an SSO cannot make
an informed decision about what technology to standardize without
"adequate and reasonably complete knowledge of both the technical
merits and the expected cost of the alternative solutions being
considered."o30 Some information that may be useful to an SSO in
assessing the cost of a solution, such as information about some
pending patents, is uniquely within the possession of SSO
participants. When an SSO participant withholds known information
about the expected cost of a solution, the SSO cannot make an
informed decision.' 3 Thus, in Phase I, SSO participants who do not
know that a proposed solution reads on a party's pending or issued
patents are much like the customers in Kodak in that by making their
decision in Phase I, they are binding themselves to a Phase II cost
they did not anticipate. On the other hand, SSO participants who have
perfect knowledge of the IP content of a proposed solution are much
like the franchisees in Queen City Pizza: they can make an informed
decision in Phase I, taking into account the costs that decision will
impose in Phase II. Thus, Kodak and Queen City Pizza support the
idea that antitrust concerns arise when an SSO participant withholds
information that is relevant to the SSO's decision-making process.
In order to determine whether an SSO participant's failure to
disclose information relevant to the SSO's decision-making process is
an "anticompetitive" or "exclusionary" means to acquire monopoly
127. Id.
128. Id. at 441.
129. Id. at 438-39.
130. AAI Amicus Brief, supra note 18, at 4.
131. See, e.g., In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., FTC Order, 2004 WL 1632816, at *27 (July 6,
2004) (observing "CARB did not know that it was taking action that would subject the
California oil industry and California consumers to Unocal's patent claims and ensuing market
power.").

2010]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN STANDARDS

483

power, it is necessary to understand how courts evaluate allegedly
anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct. Sitting en banc, the D.C.
Circuit set forth an analysis framework to distinguish between
competitive and exclusionary conduct in United States v. Microsoft
Corporation.'32 First, the court said, "to be condemned as
exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive
effect.' That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby
harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will
not suffice."l 33 Second, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the
monopolist's conduct indeed has the requisite anticompetitive
effect., 134 Third, if the plaintiff is able to establish "aprimafaciecase
under Section 2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the
monopolist may proffer a 'procompetitive justification' for its
conduct."' 3 5 Finally, if the monopolist offers an unrebutted
procompetitive justification, "the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive
benefit."' 36
Does a patent holder's failure to disclose that it has IP "harm the
competitive process and thereby harm consumers,"' 3 7 or does it just
harm the patent holder's competitors? When a patent holder
withholds information in Phase I while the SSO is evaluating the
merits of various possible solutions to a problem, the patent holder's
conduct can affect the competitive process to choose which solution
to standardize. Thus, the patent holder's failure to disclose may be
one factor leading the SSO to choose a solution that, unbeknownst to
the SSO members, is patented. On the other hand, if the SSO is
performing its intended function of selecting the best solution, then
the solution it selects must have some technical merit. Thus, it does
not necessarily follow that the patent holder's failure to disclose its IP
in Phase I automatically leads to an inferior standardized technology
simply because that technology is burdened by royalty costs. As a
consequence, it is not clear that the patent holder's failure to disclose
necessarily harms the competitive process in Phase I, nor is it clear
that consumers are harmed in Phase II by the selection of royaltyburdened standardized technology in Phase I.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 58 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 58.
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The previous section's analysis leads to the conclusion that a
patent holder who fails to disclose its IP to an SSO does not have
monopoly power unless, in Phase II, it is the only patent holder who
refuses to license its IP to competitors, whether explicitly or by
demanding royalties that make participating in the market infeasible
for competitors. In this narrow set of circumstances, the patent holder,
by definition, harms the competitive process in Phase II by closing the
market for standardized products to its competitors. The combined
behavior then harms consumers because they can buy standardcompliant products from only the patent holder, who can charge a
monopoly price. Furthermore, a patent holder in this position cannot
possibly offer a pro-competitive justification for its behavior when its
competitors not only spent time and money to participate in the SSO
but also wish to license the patented technology under reasonable
terms.
Thus, the analysis indicates that a patent holder who simply
attends SSO meetings and fails to disclose that it has IP that will be
essential to practice the standard does not violate Section 2 of the
Sherman Act simply because the patent holder failed to disclose its
IP. However, after the standard issues, if that patent holder refuses to
license its essential patents, and the patent holder is the only holder of
essential IP making such a refusal and is thus in a position to be the
only participant in the market for standardized products, the patent
holder's course of conduct constitutes a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE AS AN ANTITRUST REMEDY

FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE DURING THE STANDARDIZATION
PROCESS
When a patent holder has engaged in the course of conduct that
the previous sections concluded constitutes a Section 2 violation, the
essential facilities doctrine provides a tool to force such a patent
holder to license the patents it is leveraging to prevent others from
practicing the standard.
An essential facility is "a facility that cannot reasonably be
duplicated and to which access is necessary if one wishes to compete"
in a market.' 38 Although firms ordinarily can decide with whom they
will do business, 39 when a monopolist controls an essential facility, it

138.
139.

Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986).
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) ("In the absence of any
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is obligated to make that facility available to competitors on
nondiscriminatory terms. 14 0 A monopolist's refusal to deal when it
controls an essential facility is unlawful if it extends the monopoly
from one market into another.141
When a standard incorporates a patented invention as an
essential component of the standard, the patent becomes, in effect, an
essential facility because one wishing to implement the standard
cannot do so without having access to the patented invention. When a
patent holder who failed to disclose its essential patents to an SSO in
Phase I later refuses to license those essential patents to its
competitors who wish to practice the standard, it extends its patent
monopoly from the market for that stand-alone invention to the
consumer market for standard-compliant products. Thus, the patent
holder's refusal to deal is unlawful.
Antitrust liability attaches under the essential facilities doctrine
when four elements are present: "(1) control of the essential facility
by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably
to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility." 142 A patent holder who failed to disclose its IP in Phase I
and later refused to license that IP in Phase II is a monopolist with
control of an essential facility. Because the innovation is patented and
is incorporated into a standard, none of the patent holder's
competitors can practically or reasonably duplicate the essential
facility. If the competitors cannot license the patent, they cannot build
standard-compliant equipment, and their only options are either to
build and attempt to sell non-standard equipment, or to write a new
standard that does not incorporate the patented invention. Both are
expensive and unreasonable solutions, particularly because the patent
holder's own actions led in part to its patents becoming an essential
facility. Finally, there is no real barrier, other than greed, that prevents
the patent holder from providing the facility. It is entirely feasible for
the patent holder to provide licenses to its essential patents.

purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the (Sherman Act] does not restrict the long
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal .... ).
140. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539; MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383, 410-11
(1912); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979)).
141.
MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132.
142. Id. at 1132-33.
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Thus, the essential facilities doctrine appears to be well-suited as
a remedy for when a patent holder fails to disclose its IP to an SSO
and later refuses to license its IP to competitors who wish to practice
the standard.
CONCLUSION

Under the analysis in this paper, a patent holder's mere failure to
disclose to an SSO that it has IP that will be essential to practice the
standard does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.
As the FTC has posited, however, such behavior may constitute a
violation of the FTC Act. 14 3 If, however, a patent holder who failed to
disclose its IP later refuses to license its patents to those wishing to
practice the standard, and if the patent holder is the only party who
refuses to license its patents, the patent holder arguably violates
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The essential facilities doctrine
provides a possible remedy for this narrow circumstance.
Returning now to the question of whether the engineer from the
abstract of this paper violates Section 2 by failing to disclose his
pending patent, the answer is "it depends." By failing to inform the
other SSO participants about his pending patent, the engineer
probably does not violate Section 2 if he later agrees to license his
patent. Even if he demands high royalties for his patent, if his
competitors are willing to pay, it is unlikely that he violates the
Sherman Act. But if he fails to disclose his pending patent and later
actually or effectively refuses to license his patent, and he is the only
patent-holder refusing to license essential IP, his actions may
constitute a Section 2 violation.

143.
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 4 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), 2006 WL
2330117,4.

